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BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION v. FINCH:
UNWARRANTED COMPROMISE OF TITLE VI's
TERMINATION SANCTION
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 was enacted with the
hope that administrative efforts might counter the failure of court
enforcement and assure Negro children their constitutional right to a
desegregated education. Title VI provides in part that
no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance.2
Title VI was more than a reaffirmation of national policy; it was the
basis for an alternative approach to school desegregation. Every
federal agency administering financial assistance is thereby entrusted
with the additional duty of putting an end to discrimination in federally
assisted programs. If discrimination continues, section 602 of title VI
authorizes "the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue
In short, title VI
assistance under such program or activity . . . . "
imposed on the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Office
of Education the responsibility for desegregating all school districts
receiving federal assistance. To enforce its orders, HEW was given
the right to terminate federal aid to any school district refusing to
comply.
Although section 602 explicitly confines the termination of assistance to the political entity and particular program for which a finding
of noncompliance has been made,4 HEW's termination procedures, until
recently, considered a school district's basic elementary and secondary
education system to be a single "program." No attempt was made to
separate funds into areas (such. as remedial reading or adult education)
delimited by the specific authorizing legislation. Termination procedures did not require a finding of discriminatory use of funds under
each grant statute because departmental resources were thought inadequate to make such a finding and, more importantly, because HEW
believed that the individual parts of an educational system should not
be examined separately to determine if discrimination infects particular
parts. Thus, discrimination in any federally assisted school activity
142 U.S.C. § 2000d to -4 (1964).
2 Id.§2000d.
3

Id.§ 2000d-1.

4 Id.

(1113)
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tainted the entire system. Similarly, a general condition of segregation
in elementary and secondary classrooms was thought to reach all parts
of the system. In Board of Public Instruction v. Finch (Taylor
County),' the Fifth Circuit ruled that HEW could no longer consider
a district's basic elementary and secondary educational system to be a
single federally supported "program" but "must make findings of fact
indicating either that a particular program is itself administered in a
discriminatory manner, or is so affected by discriminatory practices
elsewhere in the school system that it thereby becomes discriminatory." ' Within the meaning of section 602, "program" was held to
refer to individual grant statutes. This Comment contends that the
Fifth Circuit's construction of section 602 seriously compromises
title VI as an effective complement to federal court enforcement for
desegregating public education.
I. Board of Public Instruction v. Finch
Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Board
of Public Instruction of Taylor County, Florida, adopted a freedom
of choice plan complying with the Office of Education's established desegregation guidelines. 7 Subsequently, in March 1966, the Board
submitted an assurance of compliance with the requirements of the
revised guidelines issued by the Office of Education. Despite this
assurance, the Board failed to implement desegregation at the pace
required by the guidelines. For example, during the 1965-66 school
year, only 10 of 975 Negro students attended formerly all-white
schools. For the school year 1967-68, Taylor County officials agreed
to transfer 74 Negro students to white schools and to begin assignment
of teachers across racial lines. Again, these commitments fell far below
the guideline requirements.
In an effort to secure voluntary compliance with the guidelines,
HEW representatives met with Taylor County school officials several
times during the spring of 1967. When these meetings failed to bring
about increased compliance, the matter was referred to an HEW
hearing examiner who ruled on April 4, 1968, that the Taylor County
school system's inadequate progress toward student and faculty desegregation constituted a violation of title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. The examiner entered an order terminating all federal aid to
education allocated to Taylor County. The order, subsequently approved by the reviewing authority, cut off $204,197.55 in aid administered under three grant statutes.8
5414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).

6Id. at 1079.
7 The factual background of the case is discussed at id. at 1070-71.
8 The grant statutes involved were: Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965 tit. II, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a-241m (Supp. IV, 1969) ; Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 tit. III, 20 U.S.C. §§§841-48 (Supp. IV, 1969); and Adult
Education Act of 1966 §§ 302-14, 20 U.S.C.
1201-13 (Supp. IV, 1969).
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On appeal, the Board argued that HEW's order terminating
Taylor County's aid to education violated section 602 of the Civil
Rights Act. That section provides, in relevant part:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this
section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to
grant or to continue assistance under such program or
activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express
finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a
failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination
or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity,
or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding
has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found . ..

.

The Board argued that section 602, in effect, requires the federal
government to make a finding of discrimination in the operation of
each program funded by a particular grant statute. In short, if HEV
desired to terminate Taylor County's financial assistance, it must
demonstrate not simply the basic dual nature of the school system, but
that a particular program was being operated in a discriminatory
fashion.
In its argument before the Fifth Circuit, HEW relied heavily on
the proposition that Taylor County was barred from raising the issue
of programmatic findings of fact by its failure to raise that question
during the administrative proceedings."0 In addition, HEW argued
that a general finding of discrimination in the operation of the school
system justified termination of all federal aid in the absence of a showing by the recipient that a particular program was free from discrimination."1 Finally, although almost as an afterthought, the Government
12
argued that the Board's interpretation of section 602 was incorrect.
The Fifth Circuit, per Judge Goldberg, rejected all of HEW's
arguments and adopted the Board's interpretation of section 602.
Reading the term "program" as used in that section to mean "particular grant statute," the court held that a general departmental finding of
discrimination in the operation of an elementary and secondary school
system is insufficient for termination of all federal education aid to that
system. In concluding that section 602 requires program-oriented
findings of fact, however, the court specifically stated that such a
9 42 U.S.C. §2000d-1 (1964) (emphasis added).

'0 Brief for Respondent at 10, Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1062
(5th Cir. 1969).
"1Id. 15-21.
1 See id. 5a-6a.
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requirement does not mean that each program must be considered
in isolation:
To say that a program in a school is free from discrimination
because everyone in the school is at liberty to partake of its
benefits may or may not be a tenable position. Clearly the
racial composition of a school's student body, or the racial
composition of its faculty may have an effect upon the particular program in question. But this may not always be the
case. In deference to that possibility, the administrative
agency seeking to cut off federal funds must make findings of
fact indicating either that a particular program is itself administered in a discriminatory manner, or is so affected by
discriminatory practices elsewhere in the school system that
it thereby becomes discriminatory.' 3
The court did not, however, provide any guidance concerning the kind
of factfinding necessary to satisfy its interpretation of section 602.
HEW was given no standards for determining what constitutes a
sufficient showing of discrimination in the expenditure of federal funds
under a particular grant statute or for deciding when one program is
"so affected by discriminatory practices elsewhere in the school system"
as to justify termination of funds.
Although the court purportedly recognized the significance of the
challenge posed by the school district's interpretation of section 602 to
the effective enforcement of title VI, 14 its treatment of the statutory
issue was neither thorough nor persuasive. It apparently concluded
that the problem of statutory construction could be resolved simply by
reading the termination clause and looking quickly at the legislative
history."
II. THE TERMINATION SANCTION OF TITLE VI
A. Legislative and Administrative Development of Section 602
Unfortunately, HEW failed to suggest and the court did not independently recognize many of the problems involved in interpreting
13 414 F.2d at 1079.
14 Nominally, this case involves a challenge to the validity of an order by
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) terminating the
payment of federal funds to the Board of Public Instruction of Taylor County,
Florida, for violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Underlying
this challenge, however, is a broader question concerning the character and
reach of the limitations which Congress has placed upon the power of an
administrative agency to cut off federal funds and the Congressional policy
behind such limitations.
Id. at 1070 (footnote omitted).
15 See id. at 1077-78.
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section 602, the "pinpoint" provision. Broadly speaking, the usual
difficulties of determining legislative intent 16 are aggravated in the
case of the Civil Rights Act because of its highly controversial provisions and the politically charged atmosphere of its enactment. The
constant maneuvering and persuasion required to secure supporting
votes often precluded any single congressional understanding of the
purpose of many provisions of the Act.' 7 In addition, formal, wellconsidered statements of the precise scope of the termination power
were sparse.' The Senate amendments to the House bill ' introduced
the first explicit limitation on the termination power and were the
product of an informal, bipartisan conference and were thus unaccompanied by any authoritative report."° Furthermore, because the
House elected to accept the Senate amendments without change, no
conference committee report explores the impact of the pinpoint
provision.2 '
Nevertheless, both the language and the legislative history of
title VI make clear that the pinpoint provision was enacted to limit
HEW's power to terminate federal funds. Southern legislators were
concerned with the possibility of arbitrary use of the broad termination
power present in the House bill.2 2 Their concern was not assuaged by
assurances that the House provision would not be interpreted as proIDThe illusory nature of "legislative intent" is described by Professor Witherspoon:
The chances that several hundred members of a legislature have the same
determinate situations in mind as being covered or not by the language of the
statute for which they vote or that a situation posited by a specific interpretive
issue later presented to a court was considered by all of them and judged
by all to fall within or without the coverage of the statute is so highly improbable as to be worth little argument.
Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: "The High
Road," 35 TEXAs L. REV. 63, 74 (1956).
17 It is difficult to ascertain congressional intent from circumstances surrounding the passage of the Civil Rights Act, since many of the changes made
seemed directed more toward securing an adequate number of supporting
votes than toward voicing a uniform purpose in any small part of the
legislation.
Note, School Desegregationand the Office of Education Guidelintes, 55 GEo. L.J. 325,
346-47 (1966). During the legislative debates on the Civil Rights Act, proponents
were concerned over the possibility of "dealing" with Southern legislators to secure
passage of the bill. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1964, at 14, col. 5. Eventually, modification of some provisions proved necessary to secure cloture and end the Senate
filibuster. See id., Apr. 26, 1964, § 4, at 11, col. 1.
18 Because Taylor County is the first case analyzing this precise statutory problem,
no judicial statements elucidate the meaning of the pinpoint provision either. The
issue was raised, but not discussed or decided in Lee County School Dist. 1 v.
Gardner, 263 F. Supp. 26 (D.S.C. 1967).
19 H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
2
0BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CiVm RiGHTs ACT OF 1964, at 289 (1964).
2
1Id.
22 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1964, at 1, col. 4; id., 9, col. 1 (criticism by Representatives Rain of Alabama, Whitener of North Carolina, Matthews of Florida, and
Boggs of Louisiana) ; id., Mar. 25, 1964, at 20, col. 6 (criticism by Senator Johnston
of South Carolina) ; id., Mar. 2, 1964, at 12, col. 3 (criticism by Senator Russell of
Georgia). According to Representative W. M. Colmer (D. Miss.), title VI would
give "every two bit bureaucrat" power "to cut the water off in your community."
Id., Feb. 1, 1964, at 19, col. 3.
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viding for a wholesale termination of federal assistance to an entire
state. The fear of proponents of the Civil Rights Act that an unqualified termination provision would seriously jeopardize the entire
bill, and the pressing need to secure sufficient Republican votes in the
Senate to enforce cloture and end the Southern filibuster on the bill,
prompted the enactment of the specific limitations of section 602.23
Although some limitation on the termination power was certainly
intended, the precise scope of the limitation was left undefined. The
Fifth Circuit sought support for its restrictive reading in the congressional debate on title VI, noting several instances in which the
term "program" was used synonymously with "grant statute." The
cited examples, however, are inconclusive and merely demonstrate the
absence of a clear and uniform interpretation of the termination power.
Several of the references to individual grant statutes as "programs"
were made during Senate debate on the House bill prior to the actual
introduction of the pinpoint provision, and thus cannot be viewed as
intentional, well-considered references to the precise language of that
provision. 4 Senate debate on the House bill, however, may be quite
relevant to an understanding of the breadth of the termination power
because, according to Senator Humphrey, ' 5 the Senate amendments
added nothing of significance, but merely expressed the existing understanding of the House bill. But the legislative history in the House
provides no clear expression of the breadth of the termination power
23
See Statement by Robert H. Finch, Secy. of the Dep't of Health, Education,
and Welfare and John N. Mitchell, Attorney General of the United States, July 3,
1969, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
2AThe pinpoint provision, worked out primarily by Senators Humphrey and
Dirksen, was part of the Senate amendments introduced on May 26, 1964. The references to "the school lunch program," cited by the court, 414 F.2d at 1077 (citing 110
CONG. REc. 7101 (1964)), were made during the Senate debate on the House bill on
April 7, 1964. One of the references to the "aid to impacted school districts [program],"
id. (citing 110 CoNG. REc. 7100 (1964)), was also made during Senate debates on
the House bill.
The same problem of chronology exists with reference to the court's statement
that "Senator Eastland went so far as to introduce in the Congressional Record a long
list of the federal programs to which the cutoff provision was applicable . .. .
Id. (citing 110 CONG. REc. 8359-61 (1964)). Senator Eastland introduced his list on
April 18, 1964, during Senate debates on H.R. 7152.
Different problems affect other illustrations offered by the court. The statements
concerning the "agricultural extension program for home economics teachers," id.
(citing 110 CoNG. Rxc. 13126 (1964)), and the "aid for vocational agriculture teaching," id. (citing 110 CONG. REc. 13126 (1964)), were made in the context of a discussion concerning limiting the fund cutoff to the offending part of a particular state.
The discussion did not focus on the second element of the pinpoint provision, that is,
limitation to the particular program or part thereof.
Finally, the reference to "the farm-to-market road program," id. (citing 110
CONG. Rac. 13331 (1964)), appears in a statement by Senator Gore concerning the
federal funds which could be affected by a termination order. It does not appear as a
definition of the term "program" as used in section 602.
25Senator Humphrey described the Senate changes in title VI in this way:
We have made no changes of substance in Title VI, which is concerned with
discrimination in programs that receive financial assistance from the Federal
Government. We have made several minor adjustments and, in addition, we
have modified the language to make explicit the declared intention of this title.

110

CONG.

REc. 12714 (1964).

1970]

TERMINATION UNDER TITLE VI

outlined in H.R. 7152.26 Furthermore, when the statutory issue presented requires an examination of particular language, to consider the
legislators' use of key terms out of context is a questionable interpretive practice at best.
Perhaps the most blatant example of dubious use of legislative
history is the court's reference to congressional discussion of the aid
to impacted school districts program.2 7 The phrase "impacted areas
school aid program" appears during debate on the House bill in a
statement made by Senator Javits referring to his previous support of
legislation prohibiting federal agencies from extending financial aid
to segregated state programs.'
The value of Senator Javits' selfcongratulatory remarks to a close analysis of the meaning of the pinpoint provision is extremely doubtful.
Furthermore, as the Fifth Circuit itself acknowledged, the legislative debates include affirmative evidence that a broader meaning
should be attributed to the term "program." The court, however,
dismissed this evidence.2 9 Legislative history indicates that Congress
was primarily concerned with two facets of the termination power: the
26 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The main House report contains no mention of
any pinpoint provision for fund termination. In a submission of additional views of

the Committee on the Judiciary to the Committee of the Whole House, Congressman

McCulloch noted that "[i]f voluntary action fails . . . and assistance must be
terminated, the termination should be 'pinpoint[ed] . . . to the situation where the
discriminatory practices prevail' as Secretary Celebrezze has stated in his testimony.
By this means, the effect of cutting off funds will be limited to the county or immediate
area where racial inequality exists." This statement indicates concern with a geographical limitation of the termination power, rather than a requirement that the
termination be made only with reference to particular grant statutes. H.R. REP. No.
914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 26 (1963).
It is difficult to determine what sort of program-oriented limitation, if any, the
House may have envisioned. The following discussion between Representative
Meader and then Secretary of HEW Celebrezze is in terms of a broad meaning of
the term "program."
Meader: You mentioned the Library Services Act. Let's assume in an area
where there is a library there is no segregation of the library so that both
Negroes and whites are fully free to use the library, but in this same community Negroes are denied voting privileges. Would you, in that case . . .
be able to withhold library funds?
Celebrezze: Not under my interpretation.
Meader: The point I was getting at is, must the discrimination under title VI
relate to the particular program with respect to which the funds are withheld,
or can you use the withholding [power] as a means of [ending] discrimination
in other programs?
Celebrezze: It would be my interpretation [that] it would only apply to the
specific program you are talking about.
Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within
the Jurisdictionof the United States Before Subcoinm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1542-43 (1963).
27414 F.2d at 1077 (citing 110 CoNG. REc. 7100, 13126 (1964)).
28 110 CONG. REc. 7100 (1964).
2
9 See 414 F.2d at 1077. The court observed:
While it is true as HEW points out that during the Senate debate on Section
602 of the Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-1) fears were expressed that termination
of aid to schools might also lead to termination of aid to roads and highways . . . such expressions of concern do not mark the inner limits of the
term "program."
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possibility that noncompliance in a single school district might lead to
termination of funds to the entire state; '0 and the possibility that
discrimination in the education program might result in the termination
of federal assistance to unrelated federally financed programs, such as
highways."
Senator Williams described consequences some congressmen feared
might arise from an unlimited termination power:
Under the language of the House bill, the Federal Government would have been permitted to withhold all of the
Federal funds going to a State under any program if it felt
there was discrimination in any part of that program in the
State. This meant that all Federal contributions toward the
school lunch program, the welfare program, the program
for aid to dependent children, the program for the blind, the
farm program, the highway program, or any other federally
supported program could have been stopped on a statewide
basis solely upon the determination of the Attorney General
or other agency head that a single entity, such as one school
district or one local board, was in his opinion practicing
discrimination. 2
The political entity limitation of the pinpoint provision was enacted
to resolve part of the problem described by Senator Williams. Legislators in both the House and the Senate had criticized the absence of
any geographical limitation on the termination power in H.R. 7152. 3
Finding scant comfort in assurances of an implied geographical limitation, Southern legislators argued that under the provisions of the
House bill an entire state would be subject to loss of federal aid because
of discrimination in the administration of a particular grant program
in one county or city.'
Such use of the termination power would
undercut any possibility of gradual desegregation; each state would be
forced to guarantee immediate desegregation of all federally supported
3

0 Perhaps

indicative of Congress' concern with eliminating cutoffs to an entire

state because of discrimination in a political subdivision is Senator Dirksen's presentation of the amended House bill.
New provisions added to this section require a finding on the record of
failure to comply with requirements under this title [title IV] and limit the
termination or refusal of assistance to the particular political entity or part
thereof or other recipient as to whom such finding is made.
110 CoNG.
31

REc.

12818 (1964).

See note 29 supra.
32 110 CONG. REc. 14330 (1964).
33 See, e.g., id. 1537 (remarks of Representative Whitener).
3
4 See, e.g., id. 8507-08 (exchange between Senators Smathers, Allott, and Cooper
including the remark by Senator Smathers that title IV was a "genocide" section
because "it would punish a whole area, a whole State, a whole group, because
of the sins of one"). In response to Senator Humphrey's assertion that the
House bill provided for a limited termination of funds, Senator Stennis noted that
"[t]he language is about as broad as one can make language. There is no limitation
in it whatsoever as to area or anything else." Id. 8642.
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facilities within its borders. Senator Humphrey offered the following
explanation of the corrective effect of the pinpoint provision on this
situation.
The title [VI] is designed to limit any termination of Federal
assistance to the particular offenders in the particular area
where the unlawful discrimination occurs. Since this was
our intention, we have made this specific in the provisions
of title VI by adding language to 602 to spell out these
limitations more precisely. This language provides that any
termination of Federal assistance will be restricted to the
particular political subdivision which is violating nondiscrimination regulations established under title VI. 5
The second clause of the pinpoint provision, the program limitation, was intended to preclude the possibility of a state or county losing
all forms of financial assistance because of discrimination in the
operation of a particular program."6 Again, Southerners were wary
of the lack of specific statutory language assuring a program-oriented
termination of aid. Although the legislative debates contain many
statements to the effect that the pinpoint provision of the Senate
amendments assures limitation of the termination power to particular
programs, 7 there is no focused discussion of the meaning of the term
"program." Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress
intended to equate "program" with "grant statute." Under this view,
the legislative purpose in enacting the program limitation was to forbid
federal agencies from cutting off funds under one grant statute to
coerce desegregation of facilities operated under another statute. In
the context of basic education, discrimination in the operation of a
title I program would not justify termination of assistance under
title II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
Congressional discussion of the program limitation does not, however,
suggest that such narrow determinations were to be required before
termination.3 8 Nowhere does it appear that Congress intended a
35 Id. 12714-15.

36See id. 9128 (remarks of Senator Cooper).
37

See, e.g., id. 12689 (remarks of Senator Saltonstall); id. 15896 (remarks of

Representative
Celler exNplaining the change made by the Senate amendments).
38

Insight into the meaning of the Senate amendment can be gleaned from the
statements of Senators Pastore and Ribicoff. According to Senator Humphrey,
particular attention was paid to their discussion of the House bill in formulating the
Senate amendments to title VI. See id. 8642, 12715.
At one point in the debate, Senator Pastore noted that any action to cut off funds
would have to be limited to the program in which discrimination was found. His
illustrations of this point reflect a broad meaning of the term "program."
Let us assume that we are considering aid to dependent children. We would
not cut off all funds for the building of a road because that is another program, although it is a Federal grant. The action must be confined to the
specific program in which discrimination exists, and then only within the
particular area where the discrimination takes place. There is no intent,
no motive, no idea of spreading the tentacles of the Federal Government to
choke off all State activity. Not at all.
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termination of funds to be limited to particular grant programs within
the framework of the elementary and secondary education system when
the entire system retained its dual characteristics.39
The Fifth Circuit also argued that HEW employed a narrow interpretation of the term "program" when issuing regulations under title
VI.4" According to Judge Goldberg, the Department's compilation of a
list of individual grant statutes and its reference to such statutes as
"programs" demonstrates its awareness of the need to find discrimination in the operation of particular grant statutes and limit the termination of funds accordingly.4 ' Again, the court seems to be giving
undue weight to the use of the term "program" out of the context of
the pinpoint provision. The list of programs contained in the regulations does not indicate HEW's understanding of the proper breadth of
the cutoff provision, but merely shows what funds could be affected by
a termination of federal aid. In fact, the Department's consistent administrative practice has demonstrated a broad interpretation of the
term "program" as it appears in section 602.42
The regulations enacted pursuant to title VI reflect HEW's view
of elementary and secondary education as an indivisible entity. Section
80.4(a) requires that
[e]very application for Federal financial assistance to carry
out a program.., and every application for Federal financial
assistance to provide a facility shall, as a condition to its approval and the extension of any Federal financial assistance
Id. 7059. Unlike the various grant statutes providing assistance to the elementary
and secondary education system, road grants and welfare grants involve completely
unrelated activities. A second illustration offered by Pastore expressed the same
concern, that school money not be used to pressure desegregation in unrelated areas:
Any nondiscrimination requirement an agency adopts must be supportable as tending to end racial discrimination with respect to the particular
program or activity to which it applies ....

Thus, title VI does not authorize

any cutoff or limitation of highway funds, for example, by reasons of school
segregation.
Id. 7063. Senator Ribicoff agreed with this analysis of title VI:
As the Senator from Rhode Island has pointed out, if there were discrimination in one school district which refused to desegregate, we certainly would
not wish to cut off public assistance or cut off road programs. Under title
VI we would deal with each program separately and apply title VI only
where the discrimination occurs.
Id. 7067.
39 One conclusion concerning the status of the legislative history on the
"particular program" element of the pinpoint provision has been expressed in a law
review note.
There was nothing to indicate that individual pieces of legislation were
considered to authorize separate "programs" or that an inconsistency is created
by the Office of Education's practice of considering a district's educational
apparatus to be a single "program."
Note, supra note 17, at 345.
40 414 F.2d at 1078 (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.2, 80.13, Appendix A (1969)).
41 Id. at 1077-78.
42

See Note, supra note 17, at 344.
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• . . contain or be accompanied by an assurance that the

program will be conducted or the facility operated in compliance with all requirements imposed by or pursuant to this
43
part.
But this requirement of individual assurances of compliance is modified with respect to federal assistance to elementary and secondary
schools. Section 80.4(c) states that the assurance requirement will be
deemed satisfied if an elementary or secondary school or school system
is subject to a final federal court order to desegregate and provides an
assurance of compliance with that order, or if the school or school system submits a plan for desegregation which the agency approves, and
provides an assurance that the plan will be carried out. 4 These regulations reflect HEW's decision that the elementary and secondary education system can be most effectively dealt with, for purposes of title VI,
as a single entity. Implicit in these regulations is a determination that
segregated operation of an elementary or secondary education system
taints every aspect of that system.4
The Department has recognized that "[t]he discrimination which
a child suffers during one part of the school day is not so ephemeral
that it fails to affect his education during the remainder of the day." 41
If an educational system is essentially dual in nature, it is unrealistic to
argue that individual programs or activities, though operated on a nondiscriminatory basis, are free from the injurious effects of segregation.
HEW raised this argument before the Fifth Circuit. According to the
Department, projects funded by federal money under title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 47 and the outdoor center
4345 C.F.R. § 80.4(a) (1) (1970).
44 Id. § 80.4(c).
45
This conclusion is supported by one of the examples given in id. § 80.5(b).
That section provides that:
In the Federally-affected area programs

.

. . for construction aid and for

general support of the operation of elementary or secondary schools or
in programs for more limited support to such schools such as for the
acquisition of equipment, the provision of vocational education, or the provision of guidance and counseling services, discrimination by the recipient
school district in any of its elementary or secondary schools in the admission
of students, or in the treatment of its students in any aspect of the educational process, is prohibited.
For the approach used for grants to institutions of higher education, see id.
§ 80.4(d) (2).
46 HEW Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for Further Relief at 14, Board
of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). Under the Department's approach, "discrimination in any school program taints the entire system
absolutely, preventing the school district from justifying, for example, funds for
library books by showing that books purchased therewith are distributed without
discrimination." Note, supra note 17, at 344.
47 Referring to title I, HEW argued: "Even if the same federally assisted services
were available at all of the elementary and secondary schools in the district, those
funds are used to support instruction at elementary and secondary schools whose
student bodies and faculties are segregated." HEW Memorandum in Opposition to
Petition For Further Relief at 11, Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068
(5th Cir. 1969).
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funded by title III,4 were automatically infected by the existing dual
school structure.
As the final element of its statutory analysis, the Fifth Circuit
noted that "each of the grant statutes involved in the case before us is
denominated a 'program' by the terms of its own statutory scheme." o
According to the court,
[i]t is perfectly clear from the differing objectives and requirements of these statutes that Congress perceived educational reform as a series of problems, each requiring its own
remedial measures. Congress did not attempt a comprehensive "school program," but adopted instead a series of projects
each intended to reach specific areas of educational need.
That this was and had been the pattern of legislative reform
was clear to the proponents of Title VI in the Senate. 0
Although this may be a plausible generalization of Congress' approach
to educational reform, it indicates little about Congress' understanding
of the breadth to be accorded particular language in the Civil Rights
Act. Clearly, the scope of the termination power should be considered
from the standpoint of the purpose of title VI and not from an analysis
of the statutory schemes of individual grant statutes.
In short, the Fifth Circuit did not make a convincing argument in
support of its restrictive reading of the termination power. Notwithstanding the court's rather facile handling of the statutory issue, the
wording of the pinpoint provision and the relevant legislative history
are far from conclusive. In rejecting the statutory interpretation
offered by HEW, the court repudiated the consistent administrative
practice of an agency.
48 Referring

to the outdoor center financed under title III, HEW noted that:
[I]t seems totally anachronistic for petitioner to urge in 1969, fifteen years

after Brown v. Board of Education, .

.

. that classes transported from a

segregated elementary or secondary school for a brief visit to a central
facility and then returned to segregated surroundings could be enjoying
treatment free from the effects of discrimination,
Id. 13 n.16.
49 414 F.2d at 1077-78. The court offers the following example. "20 U.S.C.A.
§ 8441 [sic] provides: 'The Commissioner shall carry out a program for making
grants for supplementary educational centers and services * * * .' [Emphasis added]."
Id. at 1078 n.14. The full statutory section reads:
The Commissioner shall carry out a program for making grants for supplementary educational centers and services, to stimulate and assist in the
provision of vitally needed educational services not available in sufficient
quantity or quality, and to stimulate and assist in the development and
establishment of exemplary elementary and secondary school educational programs to serve as models for regular school programs.
20 U.S.C. § 841(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). Thus, the same section uses the term "program" in both the restricted and the broad sense. Compare 20 U.S.C. §241L
(Supp. IV, 1969), cited by the court, 414 F.2d at 1078 n.14, with § 241a, which refers
to educational programs in the broad sense.
.o 414 F.2d at 1078.

1970]
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B. Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretation
Although the courts are the final interpreters of statutes, wellestablished administrative law dictates that a court must give at least
some weight to the interpretation given a statute by the agency charged
with its enforcement."l This principle is well recognized in the Fifth3
Circuit."2 But HEW never asserted the applicability of this principle,1
and the court never considered it. HEW's arguments were based upon
the assumption that its interpretation was not being challenged, or that
NevertheTaylor County had not properly raised such a challenge.a
less, in interpreting the statute, the court in Taylor County should have
accorded more weight to HEW's interpretation.
Judicial deference to administrative interpretations has been dealt
with by courts in two different ways: (1) agency interpretations are
given some weight in the court's independent interpretation of the
statute, the so-called "substituted judgment" approach, 5 and (2) an
5
1 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ; Nathanson, Adininistrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 470 (1950) ; cf.
Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative Process,
28 FopmrAm L. Rxv. 1, 84-94 (1959).
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000d-1 (1964), and Exec. Order No. 11247, 3 C.F.R.
348 (1964-65), the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and all other federal
agencies and departments, were empowered and charged with the duty to enforce
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

52 See, e.g., Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Wirtz, 381 F.2d 653, 659 (5th Cir. 1967);
Mississippi Valley Gas Co. v. FPC, 294 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1961) (Congress had
acquiesced in the interpretation); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. SEC, 235 F.2d
167, 172 (5th Cir. 1956). The Fifth Circuit has recognized this principle of deference
with regard to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969), the court noted that "it is well established administrative
law that the construction put on a statute by an agency charged with administering
it is entitled to deference by the courts, but the courts are the final authorities on issues
of statutory construction." Id. at 3.

53As noted earlier, HEW did not raise the statutory issue in its written argument
in Taylor County. Had it made a strong argument in favor of its interpretation, the
court might well have considered deference. In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 211-13
(1954), the Supreme Court relied on "the contemporaneous and long-continued construction of the statutes by the agency charged to administer them," in combination
with the successive acts and the legislative history to show that the agency had
properly interpreted Congress' intent. But if such an argument could not have been
supported by experience and legislative history, then HEW was in a better position
by not making any argument.
In DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), the Supreme Court rejected the
argument of the Attorney General, as amicus curiae, in support of the interpretation
of the Copyright Act urged by the agency, because the interpretation seemed more
the result of agency resolution to fit the situation than a consistent pattern of interpretation. The Court noted that "although we would ordinarily give weight to the
interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the agency charged with its administration
we think the Copyright Office's explanation of its practice deprives the practice
of any force as an interpretation of the statute . . . ." Id. at 577-78.
4Brief for Respondent at 7-9, Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068

(5th Cir. 1969).
o5See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 385 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir.
1967), in which the court noted:
While an agency's construction of its statute is not binding on the courts,
that construction is entitled to great weight. Petitioners must shoulder the
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agency's interpretation is conclusive if a "rational basis" for the interpretation can be found. 6 The existing case law is inconsistent in this
area because of each court's failure to articulate which proposition it
followed.5 7 Professor Davis has described this problem with reference
to Supreme Court decisions in the following way:
The plain fact is, for better or for worse, that we have two
lines of cases, not a single line of cases, and that we have no
authoritative judicial explanation of what motivates the
Supreme Court in choosing between the two lines in deciding
any particular case.-8
According to traditional theories of administrative law, a "rational
basis" standard of review is appropriate when dealing with agency
findings of fact, while the more rigorous "substituted judgment" standard is to be applied when reviewing agency determinations of questions
of law. But the law-fact distinction only raises the basic question in
another form. Itremains unclear what factors will motivate courts to
denominate a particular agency finding as one of fact or of law.
The court's opinion in the present case suffers from the confused
analysis described above. At no point in its opinion did the Fifth
Circuit articulate the scope or direction of its judicial review." The
court's failure to state carefully a standard of judicial review and
analyze the issue of statutory construction accordingly would not present a serious problem if HEW's interpretation clearly contravened
burden of persuading us that the body charged by Congress with the day-today administration of the Shipping Act has deviated from or ignored an
ascertainable legislative intention.
Id. at 681. Professor Nathanson has emphasized the importance of distinguishing
these two standards for review. Nathanson, supra note 51, at 477.
56 For a discussion of some of the factors which have influenced courts in applying
a "rational basis" standard of review to questions of law, see K. C. DAVIs, AnImNIsTRATIW LAW TREATIsE § 30.09-.14 (1958); Nathanson, supra note 51, at 490-92;
Schwartz, Gray vs. Powell and the Scope of Review, 54 MIcHi. L. Rzv. 1 (1955). For
illustrations of judicial application of the "rational basis" test, see United States v.
Drum, 368 U.S. 370, 386 (1962) (alternatively holding a district court's substitution
of its own judgment on a question of the applicability of imprecise statutory language
to a particular factual situation to be an "unwarranted incursion into the administrative domain") ; NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) (applying a limited standard of review on questions of narrow application of broad statutory
terms: "[I]n reviewing the Board's ultimate conclusions, it is not the court's function
to substitute its own inferences of fact for the Board's, when the latter have support in
the record."). A slightly different phraseology was used in Unemployment Comp.
Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1946) ("All that is needed to support the
Commission's interpretation is that it has 'warrant in the record' and a 'reasonable
basis in law.' ").

Professor Schwartz has argued that the "rational basis" standard is an abandonment of vital principles of judicial review. Schwartz, supra at 715.
57 K. C. DAvis, supra note 56, at § 30.08, at 233. Professor Davis has suggested
that court decisions concerning deference to agency statutory interpretation are in large
part discretionary. "A goodly portion of what happens in fact probably ought not
to be58 articulated." Id.
Id.§ 30.07, at 230.
59 The lack of discussion may indicate that a "substituted judgment" standard
was employed. Id. § 30.07, at 229.
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the congressional directive.6
But that was not the case here. The
language of section 602 is vague, and the legislative history both sparse
and inconclusive.'
In this situation, judicial deference should have
been considered. The Fifth Circuit, however, never explicitly considered this issue, choosing to deal with the agency solely as a party
to the proceeding. But HEW was clearly more than a litigant; in
many respects, it was the "lower court" whose statutory interpretation
was being reviewed. HEW deserved consideration as the initial
interpreter of section 602 but was given only the consideration accorded
a party.
Both deference principles are designed to aid determination of
proper statutory interpretation. The reasons for giving deference to
agencies in statutory interpretations are not points that HEW need
have raised and argued in its case. These reasons are merely evidence
of the possible correctness of the agency's interpretation. Several
factors persuading courts to give weight to agency interpretations
are: ' the degree of administrative expertise, which involves judicial
confidence in the particular agency; the consistency of the agency's
application of the particular interpretation; the length of time the interpretation has been applied; 3 whether the administrative interpretation
was contemporaneous with the act; 64 and, whether Congress has reenacted the statute with intent to approve the agency interpretation.
The presence of these factors does not demand acceptance of the
agency interpretation, but it does demand its proper consideration. The
Fifth Circuit neither accepted nor considered the interpretation of
HEW in light of these factors. Rather, it found the agency's interpretation wrong on its face, a determination supported by neither the
language nor the legislative history of section 602.
In Taylor County, judicial deference to an agency's interpretation
was warranted by each of the criteria noted above. With regard to the
criteria of agency expertise, the issue in Taylor County was arguably
not the interpretation of a technical statutory provision, nor the application of broad statutory language to an individual factual situation,
problems ordinarily requiring administrative determination, but the
interpretation of the plain words of the statute, a task for which the
60 In such a situation, reversal of the agency's interpretation would be necessary
under either standard of review.
61 See text accompanying notes 17-38 supra.
62 K. C. DAvis, supra note 56, at § 30.13, at 262-63.
63 See Canada Packers Ltd. v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.P., 385 U.S. 182 (1966).
64 See Schell v. Fauch6, 138 U.S. 562 (1891); Lindberg v. Brenner, 399 F2d 990
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
As Justice Cardozo, in Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294,
315 (1933), observed:
The [administrative] practice has peculiar weight when it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently
and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.
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judiciary is most competent.65 It is unclear, however, that courts are
always expert in such cases of statutory construction. The experience
of the administrative agency in handling the problem at which the
statute is aimed may lead to an accordance of66 special significance to
seemingly noncontroversial statutory language.
In view of the realities of the legislative process and the tremendously increased complexity of the federal aid to education problem in
the years following enactment of title VI, to conclude that Congress
was fully aware of the difficulties involved in enforcing title VI in the
context of elementary and secondary education is unrealistic. Thus,
because the language of section 602 is vague and the legislative history
inconclusive, deference to HEW's interpretation was warranted.6
The other factors are also satisfied in the case of HEW interpretations of the Civil Rights Act. The Fifth Circuit has accorded
great weight to the Department guidelines in judging the pace of desegregation, and has expressed confidence in HEW's ability to handle
the school problem.6 8 Furthermore, HEW has consistently interpreted
title VI from the time of its enactment as providing the authority for a
termination of all federal aid to an elementary and secondary school
system operated on a discriminatory basis.69 Finally, although the
statute has not been reenacted, Congress has been aware of the HEW
interpretation by virtue of the requirement that all termination orders
be filed in advance with appropriate congressional committees. When
Congress has been aware of a consistent agency interpretation, especially on so important a matter as educational funds, and has failed to
Professor Davis has observed that "[o]n ordinary problems of interpreting
statutes, except when the subject matter is technical and nonlegal, the courts are the
specialists, whether analysis of legislative history is called for, or whether the main
process is one of finding the meaning of words." K. C. Davis, supra note 56, at
§ 30.09, at 242.
66
See Peck, The Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Washington, 33 WASH. L. REv. 55, 75 (1958).
67 According to Professor Nathanson,
[w]hen language is ambiguous and legislative history fragmentary and inconclusive, an administrative judgment based upon a reasoned examination of the
problem in light of both the particular facts and the broad statutory objectives
is likely to provide the most reliable guide to the effectuation of those
objectives. If acceptance of this judgment must be reconciled with a theory
of legislative intention, it might be said that the legislature presumably
intended the statute to achieve its apparent objectives to the fullest extent
practicable within the limits clearly defined, and that the best judges of
practicability are those to whom is entrusted the primary responsibility for
administration.
Nathanson, sitpra note 51, at 491; see Ketchikan Packing Co. v. Seaton, 267 F.2d
660 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
88 See, e.g., Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 348 F.2d 729
(5th Cir. 1965).
69As of July 1969, HEW had terminated all education aid to 121 school districts
for failure to desegregate. Statement by Robert H. Finch, Secy. of the Dep't of
Health, Education, and Welfare and John N. Mitchell, Attorney General of the
United States, July 3, 1969, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania
Law School.
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act to clarify or reverse that interpretation, inaction could be interpreted
as approval.70
Although these factors did not require the Fifth Circuit to accept
HEW's interpretation of section 602, the court should have considered
them in reaching its conclusion on the statutory issue. The Fifth Circuit treated the issue in Taylor County as an ordinary problem of
statutory construction capable of resolution by analysis of language and
legislative history. But neither the words of section 602 nor the congressional discussions of the termination power provide a clear answer
to the meaning of the pinpoint provision. Thus, the court should have
considered the broader issues raised in Taylor County: the congressional purpose in enacting title VI, 7 the effectiveness of the termination sanction in achieving desegregated education, and the potential
burden created by a restrictive reading of the pinpoint provision.

III. ALTERNATIVE

TECHNIQUES FOR ENFORCING
DESEGREGATED EDUCATION

Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act reflects congressional awareness of the inability of federal courts to handle the complex problems of
school desegregation. 7' The scant progress made in the courtroom
during the decade following Brown v. Board of Educationl7necessioSome judicial opinions have attached significance to congressional inaction
0
following consistent administrative interpretation of a statute. For example, in
Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341 (1932), involving interpretation of a statutory
provision governing deportation of aliens, the Court noted that "[tihe failure of
Congress to alter or amend the section, notwithstanding this consistent construction
by the department charged with its enforcement, creates a presumption in favor of
the administrative interpretation to which we should give great weight, even if we
doubted the correctness of the ruling of the Department of Labor." Id. at 345.
But the pitfalls of attaching significance to legislative inaction have also been
recognized. See Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio, &
Mach. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 409 (1961); TIME Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S.
464, 477-78 (1959) ; Porter v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 156 F2d 891, 895
(5th Cir. 1946). See generally 43 CALIF. L. REv. 907 (1955).
In any event, the statutory requirements of referring termination orders to committees of Congress, and presidential approval of implementing regulations, probably
brought attention to the HEW approach. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1964, at 1, col. 6.
71 In Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968), the
Fifth Circuit recognized the need to look beyond the language of the Civil Rights Act
in cases of statutory construction. The court observed:
We are not only dealing with the language of the statute, but we must
look as well to the logic of Congress and the broad national policy which
was evidenced by its enactment. Our system does not favor mechanical
jurisprudence; it seeks to find the purpose and spirit of a statute and the
intention of its makers.
Id. at 353.
72 Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregationin the South, 53 VA.
W
All Deliberate Speed", 1968 U. ILL.
L. Rav. 42, 42-43 (1967) ; see Note, " . . With
L. FORUM 105, 144:
The provisions of Titles 4 and 6 worked a major change in the patterns of
school desegregation. Whereas school boards had, in the past, been able to
segregate with relative impunity, depending on the law of averages to protect
them from the relatively infrequent private desegregation suits, they now
faced a two-pronged governmental attack.
73 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tated the use of more effective means-the federal purse-for realizing
the principle of equal educational opportunity. 4 Title VI effected a
basic reallocation of federal policy enforcement in the area of education
by requiring HEW to assume a large share of the responsibility for
monitoring Southern school desegregation, and by replacing the court
order with the termination of federal funds as the sanction for assuring
compliance."m

Despite criticism of federal reluctance to employ the termination
power to the fullest extent possible,7 progress in school desegregation
has been primarily the result of administrative, and not judicial, enIn 1964, only 2.25 percent of all Negro school children
forcement."
in the eleven states of the Confederacy attended schools with white
children.7" By the 1965-66 school year, this figure had been tripled,
largely through the efforts of HEW.7" More recent figures lend further support to the value of the title VI program. 0 Experience since
1964 has clearly shown that the actual termination of federal funds may
succeed where threats of termination, efforts to secure voluntary compliance, and litigation prove ineffective."'
The importance of the title VI administrative proceeding has been
underscored by the commitment of large sums of federal money to state
education under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965.2 According to one observer:
74
According to the report of the White House Conference on Civil Rights, the
use of the termination power presents the only hope for effectuation of school
desegregation.
It was the Congressional purpose, in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, to remove school desegregation efforts from the courts, where they
had been bogged down for more than a decade. Unless the power of the
Federal purse is more effectively utilized, resistance to national policy will
continue and, in fact, will be reinforced.
Council's Report and Recommendations to the Conference, in WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE

"To FULFILL THESE RIGHTS" 41 (1966)

[hereinafter cited as Council's

Report].
7-5See Note, The Courts, HEW, and Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALE
L.J. 321, 322 (1967).
76 See Council's Report; Lieberman, The Civil Rights Fiasco in Public EducaDELTA KAPI'N 482, 485 (1966).
77 Carter, Equal Educational Opportunities for Negroes-Abstraction or Reality,

tion, 47 PHI

1968 ILL. L. FORUm 160, 176; Dunn, supra note 72, at 43-44. To a great extent,
title VI operates invisibly. According to HEW, "the success of Title VI is not
measured by the relatively small number of terminations, but rather by the large
number of recipient districts which, because of Title VI, have been induced to
cease discrimination without court action."

HEW Memorandum in Opposition to

Petition for Further Relief at 24, Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068
(5th Cir. 1969).
78UNITED STATES Comm'N ON CivIL RIGHTS, SURVEY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

IN THE SOUTHERN AND BORDER STATES,
SURVEY] ; see Carter, supranote 77, at 160,

1965-66, at 1 (1966)
176.

[hereinafter cited as

79 Carter, supra note 77, at 174-76.
so See HEW News (Jan. 4, 1970).

81 G.
AND THE
8220

ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS

1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 142 (1969).
U.S.C. §§ 241a-241m (Supp. IV, 1969).
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19701

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
greatly increased the amount of federal money available for
public schools, and did so in accordance with a formula that
pumps the lion's share of the money to low-income areas such
as the Deep South. Consequently, Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 has become the main instrument for accelerating
and completing the desegregation of Southern public schools.,"
In view of the central role played by title VI proceedings in the attempt to realize equality of educational opportunity, the potential limitation on the termination power announced in Taylor County is a matter
of serious concern.
The significance of any limitation on the termination power should
be viewed in the context of the problems confronted when other methods
of enforcing the Civil Rights Act are used.84 In Davis v. Board of
8 5 the Fifth Circuit noted some of the substanSchool Commissioners,
tive problems involved in judicial determination and enforcement of
desegregation standards. Because the time lag between the issuance of
the order of the district court and argument before the appellate court
may be substantial, it is quite possible that desegregation standards may
have evolved beyond those on which the order was based. 6 Evolving
standards require the appellate courts continually to reevaluate the
applicable law.s" This problem of identifying desegregation standards
of securing compliance from possibly
is augmented by the difficulty
8
recalcitrant district courts.
Despite such problems, it has been suggested that "courts are still
as well-equipped procedurally as the Office of Education to enforce the
desegregation of a particular school district once that school district has
come before the court." 89 Serious problems exist, however, in bringing school districts before the court and securing full adjudication
within a reasonable time. Delay and deliberate obstructionism by
school districts has severely weakened private litigation as an instrument of enforcement.9 In addition, Negro litigants often face intimidation ranging from loss of jobs and other economic reprisals to actual
physical violence.9 1 These difficulties are aggravated by a severe short83 Bickel, Forcing Desegregation Through Title VI, NEW REPUBLIc, Apr. 9,

1966, at 8.

84 See Note, supra note 17, at 348. See generally Bernhard & Natalie, Between
Rights and Rentedies, 53 GEo. L.J. 915 (1965).

85364 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1966).
86 Id. at 898.
87 Id.
88 Id.

supra note 75, at 353.
See Gellhorn, A Decade of Desegregation--Retrospectand Prospect, 9

s9 Note,
90

L. REv. 3, 5-6 (1964).

UTAH

91See Knowles, School Desegregation, 42 N.C.L. REv. 67, 76-78 (1963); cf.
Amsterdam, Unsettling Settled Questions in the Law of Civil Rights, 39 F.1RD. 484,
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age of available legal talent in the civil rights area,9" a problem perhaps
attributable to the time-consuming nature of most constitutional litigation, and the pressure of community hostility. Finally, public identification and harassment of members of such organizations as the
NAACP have impeded their efforts to provide competent counsel to
Negro plaintiffs lacking litigation funds. 3
The Civil Rights Act provides for suits by the Attorney General
to enforce timely compliance with desegregation requirements." This
procedure may avoid some of the problems associated with private litigation. For example, the lack of funds to pursue desegregation suits,
even though Negro litigants are available and willing, would no longer
be an insurmountable barrier 5 The above-mentioned economic and
extra-legal sanctions would probably seldom be applied to parties represented by the Department of Justice."6 Finally, the problems stemming
from the paucity of legal talent in the civil rights field would be alleviated to some extent. 7 Nevertheless, suits initiated by the Attorney
General will not solve all the problems in this area. In view of the
generally protracted nature of desegregation litigation, the thousands
of school districts requiring attention, and the staff and time limitations
operating on the Government, it is difficult to conclude that the Attorney General will be able to shoulder the major burden.9" In addition,
the degree of initiative exercised by the Attorney General in school
desegregation suits may depend upon political pressures and the varying attitudes of each administration toward the school problem.
486 (1966); Note, Parties Plaintiff in Civil Rights Litigation, 68 CoLum. L. Rnv.

893, 898-99 (1968).
One author offers the following description of the plight of the constitutional
litigant:
The constitutional litigant is beset by the customary client's problems-how
the case will affect his family and his job, how he will be described in the
newspapers, what will happen when the case is over. But all of these concerns are heightened for the constitutional client because he is-sometimes
unwittingly-at the center of a movement for social change and he often
comes to personify that movement.
Ginger, Legal Processes: Litigation As A Form of Political Action, in LEGAL
AsPEcTs OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 204 (D. King & C. Quick eds. 1965).
92 Ginger, supra note 91, at 202. Professor Kaplan has noted that "except for
the overworked attorneys of the Legal Defense Fund, the quality of legal representation for Negro plaintiffs has, in the main, been poor indeed." Kaplan, Comment,
64 CoLum. L. R v. 222, 227 (1964).
! 3 See McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed:" Legislative Reaction and Judicial
Development 1956-57, 43 VA. L. REv. 1205, 1235 (1957).
94 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (1964).
95 See Kaplan, supra note 92, at 226-27.
96 Id.
97Id. 227-28.
9
8 According to Professor Bickel, "Given the judicial resources that are available,
and given, indeed, the resources that can conceivably be made available to the Attorney General himself, it is still out of the question that desegregation can be
achieved wholly or even chiefly through litigation." Bickel, The Decade of School
Desegregation Progress and Prospects, 64 CoLuM. L. Rav. 193, 219 (1964).
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Neither HEW nor the Fifth Circuit mentioned the burden placed
on HEW by title VI of the Civil Rights Act or attempted to determine
the extent to which that burden would be increased by a requirement
of programmatic findings of fact. Such considerations are relevant to a
determination of the meaning of the pinpoint provision of section 602,
because it cannot be presumed that Congress would establish the termination power on one hand and block its effective implementation on
the other.99
The Civil Rights Commission has described the tremendous responsibility assumed by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare:
In April, 1965, the Office of Education was faced with the
massive task of determining whether 4,941 school districts
in the Southern and border states, each unique, were in compliance with the standards adopted by that office to implement
Title VI. 10 0
It was originally hoped that state education agencies would assume
a position of responsibility in the effort to achieve desegregation of
local school districts.1 01 Initial hopes, however, were frustrated by the
inability or unwillingness of local districts to act voluntarily. The
Office of Education was forced to establish standards for desegregation
and to insure their enforcement."° The result was an enormous increase in the volume of Department work required for proper evaluation of assurances of compliance and of particular desegregation plans
submitted by local districts. Time and additional manpower had to be
expended pursuading school officials to adhere to previously submitted
plans and in initiating administrative proceedings against intractable
03
districts.

Despite the progress made in the last six years, a significant core
of resistance to HEW desegregation requirements remains.1 04 Moreover, HEW must determine whether school districts ostensibly desegregating under accepted plans are, in fact, meeting the obligations of these
plans. In short, HEW's task is far from complete. Whether or not
it will be accomplished depends in part upon the effect of the Taylor
County decision..
The huge sums of money administered and the large number of
state and local educational agencies involved in the process underscore
9

W See Note, spra note 17, at 325, 346.
00 SuRvEY 25; see Bailey & Mosher, Implementation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, 49 PEi DELTA KAPPAi 300 (1967-68).
101 Note, supra note 75, at 321, 345.
102Id.
103 Stiv

25-26.
See Statement by Robert Finch, Secy. of the Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare and John N. Mitchell, Attorney General of the United States, at 4,
July 3, 1969, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 04
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the difficulty of HEW's task. For example, under title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which funds programs for
educationally deprived children, 9.2 million school children in 16,000
school districts participated in fiscal 1968; .. 1.12 billion dollars were
allocated for fiscal 1969.1"6 The federal formula for determining eligibility includes ninety percent of the school districts in the fifty states,
the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, and the trust territory of the Pacific Islands."°7
Inadequate and overly centralized staffing has also impeded
The drain on manHEW's efforts to enforce title VI effectively."
power resulting from the demands of administrative detail inhibits
HEW from conducting the field investigations crucial to determinations
of actual compliance. 109 Administrative necessity required the adoption
of minimum desegregation percentages as a test of good faith effort." 0
A recent attempt to reorganize on a regional basis has not been completely successful; administrative difficulties persist.",
HEW's task is made more difficult by the complex, time-consuming
process prerequisite to a termination of federal funds."' The process
is so extended that it has been suggested that the effective use of the
105 U.S. BUREAu OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUcATION, OFFICE OF EDUCATION, PROGRAms 9 (1969).
106 Id.
lOId. Under title III, Supplementary Educational Centers and Services, 1800
active projects, at a total cost of $187 million, are reaching approximately 10 million
elementary and secondary school children, 135,000 preschoolers, 67,000 out-of-school
youths, 300,000 teachers, and 131,000 parents and other adults. Currently, 7200 school
districts are participating under title III. For fiscal 1969, $165 million were allocated.
Id. 14.
108 See Lieberman, supra note 76, at 485; Note, supra note 75, at 321, 354. The
White House Conference on Civil Rights concluded:
To achieve the intended results, the Offlce of Education must provide for a
mnuch enlarged technical staff, insist that compliance calls for meeting both
the letter and the spirit of the laz, and develop nore prompt and efficient
machinery for withholding or terminating Federal aid where reasonable
compliance efforts have failed.
Council Report 41.
109 SURvEY 25-26. The inadequate number of trained professionals necessitated
the hiring of summer law students to check complaints and conduct investigations.
Hearings on Policies and Guidelines for School Desegregation Before the House
Rules Comm., 89th Cong., 2d. Sess., pt. 1, at 52 (1966) (remarks of Harold Howe II,
U.S. Comm'r of Education, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare).
110 [I]n administrative terms, there was simply no conceivable way in which
a tiny staff in Washington could accurately assess the subtleties of local
resistance used to subvert free-choice plans. Only by creating an administrative presumption of noncompliance if performance fell below a specified
minimum did the problem become manageable.
G. OREnE,
supra note 81, at 142.
111 Note, supra note 75, at 321, 347.

112 The procedure has been described less charitably as "cumbersome." Id. 353;
see Rachlin, The 1964 Civil Rights Law: A Hard Look, 2 LAw IN TRANs. Q. 67, 79
(1965).
Edwin Yourman, Assistant General Counsel for HEW, estimated that
average termination proceedings last over one year.

Oct. 15, 1969.

Interview in Washington, D. C.,
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termination power depends in part on a failure by school districts to
take full advantage of existing procedural rights." Of course, in dealing with so sensitive an issue as the termination of federal funds, procedural safeguards are necessary as a check against hasty or indiscriminate application of the sanction." 4 But the resulting burden on
HEW should be recognized.
Briefly, the HEW regulations require written notice of title VI
proceedings "5' and an answer within twenty days by the respondent
school district."' HEW may amend its notice of hearing once as a
matter of course before service of the school district's answer," 7 and
the school district may amend its answer subject to certain time limitations."" Following the hearing, the presiding officer, depending upon
his authority, either renders an initial decision or certifies his findings
and a recommended decision to the proper department official." 9 Exceptions and responses may then be filed with the reviewing authority
and a decision on the exceptions made. 2 A petition for discretionary
review by the Secretary of HEW may be filed,"3 followed by judicial
review according to the Administrative Procedure Act."22 Furthermore, termination proceedings cannot be initiated until it has been
demonstrated that voluntary compliance efforts have been unsuccessful.m Actual termination cannot take place until a copy of the termination order has been filed with the appropriate committee of Congress. 4
In view of the mechanics of federal fund allocation and staff limitations which characterize HEW, a requirement of program-oriented
findings of fact will create additional obstacles to the effective enforcement of title VI. 2 5
113 Many school districts have not contested the proceedings, but a concerted
effort to thwart the administrative process by all school districts taking full
advantage of all their procedural rights would at least delay the effectiveness of the enforcement proceedings, given the smallness of the Office of
Education litigation staff.

Note, supra note 75, at 353.
"14See 110 CONG. REc. 8642 (1964) (remarks of Senator Pastore); id. 12617
(1964) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
115 45 C.F.R. § 81.51 (1970).
"6 Id. § 81.52.
"17Id. § 81.53.
n8 Id.
"9Id. §81.102.
32d. §81.103.
'2 Id. § 81.106.
1 42 U.S.C. §2000d-2 (1964).
= Id. § 2000d-1 (1964).
124 Id. Although Congress is given no apparent power at this stage, calling
the agency before the committee may well discourage termination proceedings in some
cases. Rachlin, supra note 112, at 80.
' 2 5It has been suggested that requiring HEW to tie each dollar cut off to a discriminatory practice would "render the section [Title VII essentially ineffective as
applied to school desegregation." Note, supranote 39, at 346.
According to HEW, such a requirement, in light of funding arrangements and
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The federal government allocates financial assistance according to
two basic funding arrangements. 126 Under one, federal funds are administered directly to local school districts. The bulk of federal money,
however, is distributed to the state education agency which assumes
full responsibility for redistribution to local school districts. In most
cases, HEW does not maintain records of the exact amount of federal
money subgranted to particular districts or of the nature of individual
projects supported by federal funds."'
Because the Taylor County decision requires HEW to make findings of discrimination in the operation of individual grant statutes, an
additional burden is placed on HEW to secure information regarding
the precise use of federal funds. States agencies themselves may be
unable to describe the current use of the federal funds dispensed by
them, although the various grant statutes generally require the local
recipient to submit to the state agency an annual report on the use of
federal funds, and such other reports as the state agency may require,1 2
just as similar provisions require reports from state to federal
agencies.!2" In response to the apparent mandate of Taylor County,
HEW has prepared and distributed a form

130

to individual school

districts designed to trace the sources, amounts, and usages of all
federal funds in the district. This newly imposed requirement to receive and process grant statute reports not only from the states but
also from the individual districts obviously increases the paper work
burden on HEW staff members, assuming local officials are willing
to comply.
Unfortunately, these statutory provisions and the HEW form do
not necessarily provide an easy answer to the problem presented by
Taylor County. The federal government must rely on the good faith
cooperation of state and local education agencies. In view of the statutory provisions for reporting, an agency will be unlikely simply to refuse
to provide the necessary information. There is ample opportunity,
the extent of available information, would place an intolerable burden on the Department.
If . . . the General Counsel must prove what money is in what pipeline,

and at what point in the pipeline, before he can obtain an order terminating,
refusing to grant and to continue Federal financial assistance for use by any
particular school district under its program, and if the order is restricted
to intercepting that particular money, then effective enforcement of Title VI
is impossible.
HEW Brief at 40, Barbour Co., Ala., C.R. No. 2 (1965); see Note, Federal Aid to
Higher Education: The Challenge to Fraternal Freedom of Association, 1966
Wisc. L. REV. 1252, 1256.
126 HEW Brief at 30-31, Barbour Co., Ala., C.R. No. 2 (1965).
127 HEW Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for Further Relief at 8 n.10.
Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
12' See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 241e (a) (7) (Supp. IV, 1969).
129 See, e.g., id. § 241f(c) (3).
130 HEW, Report to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, pursuant
to 45 C.F.R. § 80.66 on the specific uses of federal financial assistance.
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1970]

however, for school districts or states to submit confusing or inconclusive information, particularly with reference to grant statute programs
supporting numerous distinct projects."2 ' As one federal official has
observed, reports from state and local agencies generally refer to project
numbers, or some other general description of fund usage, and seldom
A determination
contain an exact statement of what is being done.'
of either program mechanisms or project beneficiaries requires timeconsuming reference to individually filed applications at federal and
state levels. 33
Most importantly, even after this information is gathered, it may
not be meaningful to an HEW staff member unfamiliar with local or
state customs and conditions. 3 ' Thus additional field investigations
may be necessary. When several projects are simultaneously supported
by a single grant statute, the burden of unraveling a single program
and monitoring its implementation within the district becomes extremely complex.35
Even if adequate information concerning current use of federal
assistance for elementary and secondary education is available, problems
arise if the school district shifts funds into a new or different program.
HEW described the difficulty in this way:
Each time a use was found to be affected by the discrimination, the school district could simply announce a different use
within its elementary and secondary school system and thus
require new findings which would have to be preceded by a
lengthy administrative process. Title VI would have little
influence on and would provide little impetus for correction
of the basic discrimination. 3
Although this result is obviously intolerable from an administrative
standpoint, it would seem to follow from the Taylor County holding
13 1

In addition to the basic problem of recalcitrant educational agencies, requesting
additional reporting and information presents other difficulties. According to Bailey
& Mosher, "reporting usually connotes an authority-subordinate relationship. The
drafters of ESEA [Elementary and Secondary Education Act] had scrupulously
attempted to avoid language which would suggest that reporting requirements were
tantamount to Federal control of State and local educational administration.' Bailey
& Mosher, supra, Note 100, at 124. Thus, the Taylor County requirement and the
resultant need for a closer federal check on the disbursement of government money
may aggravate already strained relations in the sensitive area of federal aid to
education.
132 Letter from Lloyd R. Henderson, Education Branch Chief, Office for Civil
Rights, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Dec. 22, 1969.
233 Id.
134 Id.
135 Interview with Thomas C. Rosica, Director of Federal Programs for the
School District of Philadelphia, in Philadelphia, Dec. 17, 1969.
136 HEW Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for Further Relief at 25, Board
of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
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that a termination order applies only to the specific use described in a
formal finding of discrimination.
The Taylor County requirement may also impede the exercise of
other powers specifically granted to federal agencies under the Civil
Rights Act. Section 602 states in part that compliance with rules
adopted pursuant to that section may be achieved by the "termination
of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance .

.

.

.,

Because

determinations in advance of whether a school district will use particular federal funds in a discriminatory manner would be extremely difficult, a requirement of program-oriented findings of fact would make an
initial refusal to grant federal funds virtually impossible.3 8
These considerations support HEW's interpretation of the pinpoint provision of section 602. But as the Fifth Circuit noted, even
if HEW's argument that the term "program" refers to the broad
elementary and secondary education program is accepted, some meaning
must be given to the words "or part thereof." "' According to the
court, these words refer to the individual grant statute. 14 0 But another
interpretation is possible.
As noted earlier, during the congressional debates much concern
was expressed over the possibility of a statewide termination of aid. 41
The political entity limitation was intended to obviate the problem of
an entire state losing federal education assistance because of the discrimination prevailing in a particular school district. But it must be
remembered that title VI applies to all federally assisted activities, not
just to those, such as education, which are normally controlled at the
local level. It was the fear of some legislators, notably Senator Gore,
that in the case of programs administered on a state basis-that is,
directly by a state agency-the political entity limitation would be ineffective in attempting to pinpoint the termination of federal aid.
Senator Gore expressed the following reservations about the effectiveness of the Dirksen amendments:
Concern had been expressed by some, including myself, that
the language of the bill would authorize termination of aid
to an entire State, even though the discrimination might be
alleged to exist in only one county of that State. The language of the substitute (the Dirksen amendment), even
though intended to prevent this result, does not, in my
opinion, do so in many programs. There are many types of
Federal aid programs. The procedures by which these programs are administered vary substantially. Under those
13742 U.S.C. §2000d-1 (1964).
8
13 HEW Brief at 44, Barbour Co., Ala., C.R. No. 2 (1965).
139 414 F2d at 1077.
140 Id.
141 See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
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programs which are administered by the States, statutory
requirements may preclude the termination or the withholding
of aid on any basis other than a statewide basis. In such
cases those who would administer the provisions of Title VI,
under either the language of the substitute or the language of
the original bill, might well find that they must terminate aid
to the entire State or not terminate it at all. In many aid
programs, the State is the "recipient" of the "assistance."
In such cases, there is no direct relationship, contractual or
otherwise, between the Federal Government and a local
political subdivision.4s
If this analysis is correct, it cannot be argued that the "or part
thereof" language of the political entity limitation would obviate the
necessity of a statewide cutoff in cases of state administered programs.
Section 602 limits the termination or refusal of assistance to "the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom
such a finding has been made . ..

" 143

According to Senator Gore,

in state administered federal aid programs the state would be the
"recipient" of federal funds as that term is used in section 602 and as
such would be subject to the termination provisions of title VI.
This program may be overcome if the "part thereof" language
of the program limitation is viewed as a corollary to the political entity
limitation. That is, in cases of state administered programs, involving
no political subdivisions, the "part thereof" language may avoid the
necessity of a statewide cutoff when discrimination exists only in
particular locations. This interpretation of the "part thereof" language,
suggested during the debates by Senator Ribicoff 14" and adopted by
HEW,145 is completely consistent with the policy of the Act and imposes far less of an administrative burden on the Department.
142 110 CoNG. REc. 13126 (1964).

143 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1964) (emphasis added).
144 In response to the fears expressed by Senator Gore, Senator Ribicoff stated:
It should be pointed out that the new language mentioned by the Senator from
Tennessee provides that any fund cutoff must be limited not only to the particular program in which discrimination occurs, but also must be limited to
the part of the program in which discrimination occurs.
It is my understanding, with the language placed in the Dirksen-Mansfield
substitute, that what now takes place . . . is that in a State having 100
counties and receiving $100,000, each county receiving $1,000, should one
county discriminate under the language previously used, it could have been
argued that the State would lose $100,000. Under the language of the
Dirksen-Mansfield substitute, it is my understanding that what would actually
take place . . . would be that the State would receive $99,000, and that they
would distribute the $99,000, $1,000 to each of the 99 counties, but would not
make any distribution to the one county that was in the process of discriminating.
110 CONG. REc. 13126 (1964).
145 Brief for Respondent at 6a, Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F2d 1068
(5th Cir. 1969).
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CONCLUSION

Since the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, progress in desegregating Southern schools has been an administrative rather than a
judicial accomplishment. Armed with the effective sanction of terminating aid to recalcitrant school districts, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare had become both the spearhead and overseer
of the integration effort. By impairing the effectiveness of this statutory goad, Taylor County has seriously stifled the power and expedition
once given HEW to force the pace of Southern school desegregation.
Termination may in fact injure those whom the Act was initially intended to benefit, and the probability of this result must be weighed
against the larger goal of integrated schools. But in view of HEW's
prior success in hastening desegregation, the balance is clearly in favor
of a less restricted power to sever federal funds.
Mark 0. Heaney

